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INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement’s use of Global Positioning System (GPS) devices continues to expand as the technology gains recognition as an
efficient, accurate, and inexpensive method to monitor a suspect’s
public movement in automobiles.1 Federal courts have generally upheld the warrantless use of these devices and determined they do not
infringe an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to a “reasonable
expectation of privacy”.2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, however, has recently held that the warrantless use
of GPS devices to monitor vehicle movements on public roads is unlawful when used over a prolonged period.3 The D.C. Circuit based
this holding on the belief that long term GPS tracking reveals “the
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whole of one’s movements”4 and that this collection of movements
reveals “more … than the sum of its parts.”5
Regrettably, the D.C. Circuit’s analysis and decision inserts new
variables into the already complicated equation used to assess the lawfulness of warrantless surveillance by law enforcement agencies. This
decision has split the federal circuits and produced two immediate
issues for D.C. Circuit law enforcement. First, since “collections of
movements” can also be gathered through previously lawful visual
surveillance, the court’s ruling creates confusion for law enforcement
regarding what quantity and type of surveillance results in suspect
data that is more than “the sum of its parts.”6 Second, the tipping point
for unlawful surveillance is unknown since “conduct that is initially
constitutionally sound could later be deemed impermissible if it becomes part of the aggregate.”7
This Note contends that by adhering to an analytical framework
provided by Supreme Court precedent, the D.C. Circuit could have
arrived at the same conclusion without the need to establish a derivative approach of assessing the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy.
Part I outlines the Supreme Court decisions establishing the modern
approach to privacy protection and what constraints the judiciary has
placed on law enforcement’s warrantless use of technology used to
track automobile movement. Part II then provides an overview of law
enforcement’s use of GPS technology and identifies a framework for
warrantless use of this technology. Finally, Part III concludes with a
review of the D.C. Circuit’s holding in United States. v. Maynard and
an application of the analytical framework to the facts of that case.
I. UNDERPINNINGS OF ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISIONS ESTABLISHING REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
A. Fourth Amendment Protection and Katz
The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause … describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”8 This Constitutional
4
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protection provides a judicial safeguard intended to check the executive branch’s law enforcement powers and ensure individuals are not
secure “only in the discretion of the police.”9 But, the protections of
the Fourth Amendment are not absolute since, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to
the public … is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection …
[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”10
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court re-assessed the
boundaries of privacy in a case involving the government’s use of an
electronic listening device to eavesdrop on the defendant’s conversations within an enclosed public telephone booth.11 Shifting the question of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search
and seizure from “areas” to people, the majority held that “[t]he Government’s activities … violated the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”12 As a result of this decision, the personal right to a
“justifiable … expectation of privacy”13 was affirmed and electronic
intrusions by the government into this sphere of privacy expectations
were equated with a physical intrusion.14 Essentially, the Court determined that the means of intrusion were irrelevant if the end result was
the violation of an individual’s reasonable privacy expectations.
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion expanded upon the majority’s
articulation of a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy ….”15 Justice Harlan’s analysis of prior decisions and the majority holding in Katz led to his conclusion that there was a “twofold
requirement” used to determine whether an individual has legitimate
expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment: 1) did the person “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”; and 2)
was the expectation “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’?”16
Expanding upon this rule, Justice Harlan noted that a person’s
home is a location where both the individual and society would rec9
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ognize a reasonable expectation of privacy, “but objects, activities, or
statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not
‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited.”17 Applying this evaluation to the facts in the case, Justice
Harlan concluded that although a telephone booth is accessible to the
public “it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’
expressions of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable”
and thus the government’s intrusion into the defendants’ privacy was
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.18 In later decisions, the “lower
courts … came to rely upon the Harlan elaboration, as ultimately did a
majority in the Supreme Court.,”19 Federal courts applied this Fourth
Amendment “Katz” standard in cases where an individual “invoking
its protection can claim … a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that
has been invaded by government action.”20
Since the decision in Katz, federal courts have continued to apply
this standard when assessing the use of surveillance technology by
law enforcement in opposition to a suspect’s reasonable expectation
of privacy. Using the Katz standard, federal courts have authorized
law enforcement’s warrantless use of numerous surveillance techniques including aerial photography,21 videotape surveillance,22
searches of curbside trash,23 airborne visual surveillance,24 canine
sniffs,25 chemical field tests,26 file access through peer-to-peer file
sharing,27 and location tracking of airplanes.28 Although the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on a case involving the warrantless use of GPS
technology,29 it has held that law enforcement can track the location
of an automobile travelling on public roads without a warrant.
B. Privacy on Public Roads and Knotts
17
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The Supreme Court first applied the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” concept to law enforcement’s use of a technological device
to track the movements of a car in United States v. Knotts.30 In Knotts,
a “beeper” had been placed in a five-gallon drum of chemicals that the
suspect subsequently purchased and transported by vehicle to a cabin
in rural Wisconsin.31 By following the suspect’s vehicle “using both
visual surveillance and a monitor which received the signals sent from
the beeper”32 the police were able to eventually locate a narcotics
laboratory owned by the defendant in the rural woodland of Wisconsin.33 The defendant challenged the government’s warrantless use of
the tracking device as a Constitutional violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection of an individual’s reasonable expectations of
privacy.34
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the “governmental surveillance … in this case amounted principally to the following of an
automobile on public streets and highways”35 and commented that it
has consistently held that there is a “diminished expectation of privacy
in an automobile ….”36 Further, the Court stated “[a] car has little
capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares
where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”37 Finally,
the Court explicitly declared that “[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements from one place to another.”38 The suspect’s movements in this instance were, in the Court’s view, a voluntary conveyance of information “to anyone who wanted to look.”39
Since the suspect’s vehicle was always visible along the route to
the cabin, the Court held that there could be no expectation of privacy
even when law enforcement did not maintain constant visual surveillance of the automobile.40 Moreover, the Court noted that the suspect
could not expect privacy once he drove his automobile off the public
highway and entered the defendant’s premises since the vehicle was
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still subject to visual surveillance from public places near the cabin.41
Although the “beeper” technology enabled the police to monitor the
suspect’s automobile movements without requiring constant visual
contact, “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police
from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in
this case.”42
The Court in Knotts established no limits on the length or extent
of surveillance conducted under this “public thoroughfare” standard
and held that technology that supports and enables police efficiency is
not presumptively unconstitutional.43 Addressing the specific issue of
the sense-enhancing nature of the surveillance technology employed,
the Court found that “scientific enhancement of this sort raises no
constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also raise.”44
The Court concluded that, “[i]nsofar as respondent’s complaint appears to be simply that scientific devices such as the beeper enabled
the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no
constitutional foundation. We have never equated police efficiency
with unconstitutionality, and we decline to so now.”45
Despite the Knotts’ holding, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
would limit law enforcement’s warrantless use of science and technology when it was deemed either overly invasive or “extrasensory.”46
Federal courts have considered technology to be overly invasive when
used to penetrate a recognized zone of privacy, such as a home.47 The
courts consider technology to be “extrasensory” when not simply
augmenting or assisting the human senses.48 In each situation, the
warrantless use of such a technology is regarded as a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.
C. Limits on the Warrantless Use of Technology: Karo and
Kyllo
When faced with the overly invasive use of technology by law enforcement in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court found, “[i]t is
the exploitation of technological advances that implicates the Fourth
41
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Amendment, not their mere existence.”49 Finding such an exploitation
in Karo, the Court held the Fourth Amendment is violated when
technology is used in areas not open to visual surveillance where individuals have a “justifiable interest” in privacy.50 The technology implicated in Karo, a beeper similar to the one used by law enforcement
in Knotts, was attached to a can of ether that was expected to be used
by the suspect to extract cocaine from clothing.51 As the can of ether
moved to different locations, law enforcement agents monitored its
movement through “both visual and beeper surveillance.”52 Eventually, the ether can was moved by vehicle to a private residence and
agents later determined, using just the beeper, that the can had been
moved inside the residence.53 Therefore, using information derived
solely from the beeper attached to the ether can, federal agents were
able to ‘locate the ether in a specific house” and use that information
“to secure a warrant for the search of the house.”54
However, unlike the use of the beeper in Knotts, law enforcement
obtained information in Karo “that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”55 Although the suspect automobile in
Knotts was not under constant visual surveillance, he did not have an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the opinion of the
Court, since travel on public roads voluntarily conveys information to
third parties.56 In Karo, however, there was no opportunity for visual
surveillance. Once the ether can moved into a private residence, there
was a justifiable expectation of privacy “free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant … that society is prepared to recognize ….”57 Consequently, the Supreme Court declared the warrantless
use of the beeper in Karo to be “[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property … withdrawn from public view” that violates privacy interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment.58
Seventeen years after its decision in Karo, the Supreme Court was
presented with an “extrasensory” governmental intrusion into personal
privacy in Kyllo v. United States.59 In Kyllo, police officers used a
thermal imaging device to determine that the defendant was using
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“halide lights to grow marijuana in his house ….”60 The thermal scanner used by the officers did not penetrate the interior of the residence’s walls, but instead detected the heat radiating from the home.61
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision
of the lower court, finding that this was not an intrusion into the defendant’s privacy.62 The court based its conviction affirmation on their
conclusion that the defendant “had shown no subjective expectation of
privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping
from his home … and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager ‘did not expose any
intimate details of Kyllo’s life’.”63 The Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision.64
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Kyllo, declared that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of [a] home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ … constitutes a search.”65 Thus, by limiting “technological enhancement” of
lawful visual surveillance, this standard preserves the “degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted.”66 Importantly, the Kyllo decision stipulates that surveillance where “the Government uses a device that is not in general public use” to discover “unknowable” information constitutes a “search
[that] is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”67 Unfortunately, the Court declined to provide a definition for “general public
use” in Kyllo and it has yet to elaborate on the limits implied by this
language.68
II. WHAT EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY DOES SOCIETY
HAVE RELATED TO GPS TECHNOLOGY: AN
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
60
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A. The “General Public Use” of GPS Technology
Federal courts lack a definition of “general public use,” yet they
have been required to assess whether GPS technology fits within this
classification. This produces mixed results.69 Factors complicating the
determination include the number of GPS navigation devices purchased and in use,70 consumer familiarity with these devices,71 and
judicial confusion in distinguishing a GPS tracking device used by
law enforcement from a more common consumer GPS navigation
device.72 Generally, a consumer GPS navigation device provides simple current location functionality along with destination direction capabilities.73 However, law enforcement GPS tracking devices are
much more powerful and covert, and they bear little resemblance to
the simple beeper used by the police in Knotts that only provided “relational pings.”74
The GPS tracking devices used by law enforcement agents are
small, inconspicuous devices that can be attached anywhere on a vehicle.75 Self-powered, these GPS devices have a battery life of “many
69
See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 393 n.10 (D. Mass.
2010) (noting that the GPS in question, which the court found to be “highly sophisticated” was in general public use because of the wide availability of GPS units).
70
See, e.g., Kevin J. O’Brien, Smartphones cut ground out from under navigation devices, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 14, 2010, at 14 (“[T]he number of personal
navigation devices shipped globally will peak in 2011 at 42 million, up from 40 million this year.”).
71
See, e.g., Ludovic Privat, NAVTEQ: Continued Growth in Consumer
Navigation Use, GPS BUSINESS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2011),
http://www.gpsbusinessnews.com/NAVTEQ-Continued-Growth-in-ConsumerNavigation-Use_a2812.html (noting that in 2009, “46% of American consumers
surveyed reported having experience with a GPS navigation device or application.”).
72
See Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 393 n.10 (explaining that the GPS in question, which allowed the FBI to accurately locate Sparks’ vehicle at any time from any
computer was highly sophisticated, but did not require a warrant under Kyllo because
“GPS devices are widely available to the public at large.”).
73
See, e.g., GPS Buying Advice, GPS features, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG,
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/tires-auto-parts/gps/gps-buying-advice/gpsfeatures/gps-features.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
74
See, e.g., Sparks, 750 F.Supp. 2d 384 at 393 (“It is true that the GPS device used here was highly sophisticated, allowing the FBI accurately to locate Spark’s
vehicle from any computer, at any time of the day or night, and store a record of his
travels for the entirety of the eleven day period. This is certainly more advanced than
the relational “pings” of the beepers of yesteryear.”).
75
See, e.g., Deleware v. Holden, C.A. No. 10-03-0545, 2010 WL 5140744,
at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2010) (stating that “GPS devices operated by batteries
permit the device to be attached anywhere on a vehicle”); and id. at 5-6 n. 3 (stating
that “GPS devices that do not have their own internal battery source must be placed
such that they can be attached to the vehicle’s battery.”).
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weeks” and they are generally equipped with a recorder and often a
transmitter as well.76 Those equipped with a transmitter allow for realtime tracking of a suspect vehicle and have the ability to create a record of the target’s activity.77 Other GPS tracking devices are
equipped with a recording device that “automatically keeps a detailed
time and place itinerary of everywhere the vehicle travels and when
and how long it remains at various locations.”78 With these devices,
law enforcement agents are no longer required to continuously monitor suspect automobiles; agents can simply remove the device from
the vehicle at their convenience and download the results.79
Therefore, unlike beeper technology, GPS tracking does not
merely augment visual surveillance, but, instead, equips law enforcement with a “technological substitute for traditional visual tracking.”80
Moreover, GPS tracking devices provide law enforcement with meticulous logs, which include intimate details of a tracked individual’s
past activities81―regardless of lawfulness. This surveillance provides
law enforcement with valuable “information not otherwise available
to the government” because it cannot maintain persistent long-term
surveillance of a suspect vehicle without “extrasensory” electronic
support.82 GPS devices, unlike beepers, do not simply transmit “‘Here

76

See, e.g., id at 5 (stating that “[t]he battery on a GPS device can last for
many weeks without needing to be recharged.”).
77
See, e.g., id. at *6 (“GPS receivers equipped with a transmitter can easily
record and relay relatively accurate positional information 24 hours a day to thirdparties.”).
78
Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295,
317 (2004) (explaining that the GPS devices attached to vehicles keep detailed logs of
where the vehicles travel).
79
See, e.g., id. (describing the removal, “[l]ater, law enforcement agents
remove the device and download the detailed itinerary of where and when the vehicle
has traveled. Unlike beepers, GPS devices do not require continuous monitoring by a
law enforcement agent.”).
80
State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 262 (Wash. 2003) (describing that
“unlike binoculars or a flashlight, the GPS device does not merely augment the officers’ senses, but rather provides a technological substitute for traditional visual tracking.”).
81
See, e.g., id. (finding that “intrusion into private affairs made possible with
a GPS device is quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great deal
about an individual’s life”).
82
United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865-67 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d en
banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (1976) (holding that without the
beeper’s aid, the agents would not have been able to seize evidence that implicated
Holmes. However, the issue in cases involving electronic monitoring is whether the
government has invaded an individual’s “right of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property[.]”) (citations omitted)).
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I am;’”83 rather, this technology communicates “[h]ere I am, here is
where I have been, and here is how long I was there.”84
Regrettably, familiarity with the commercial application of GPS
technology can create misperceptions regarding the intrusiveness of
the GPS tracking devices used by law enforcement.85 Furthering the
confusion, American society now utilizes GPS tracking devices for
more than simple vehicle navigation, such as for tracking truant students,86 probationary criminals,87 children,88 and school buses.89 However, these methods of use of GPS tracking are either consensual or
court-ordered, and State concern over the misuse of GPS tracking has
led to the development of statutory proscriptions in some jurisdictions
against private GPS device tracking.90 Interwoven into the complica-
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See, e.g., id. at 865 n.12 (“The beacon does convey information as useful
as any obtained from a wiretap. As Judge Tuttle of this panel observed at oral argument, the beeper continually broadcasts the statement, ‘Here I am’.”).
84
See, e.g., Jackson, 76 P.3d at 221 (explaining that the GPS device attached
to the suspect’s car kept a log of where he went and how long he stayed at each location).
85
See, e.g., State v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 393 n.10 (D. Mass. 2010)
(grouping the “highly sophisticated” GPS devices used by law enforcement agents
with those available to the general public).
86
Eric Carpenter, Kids Who Skip School are Tracked by GPS, THE ORANGE
COUNTY REGISTER (Feb. 17, 2011. 1:54 PM),
http://www.ocregister.com/news/school-288730-students-program.html. (describing
how “[s]eventh- and eighth-graders with four unexcused absences or more” were
assigned to carry a GPS device, and how “[e]ach morning on schooldays, they get an
automated phone call reminding them they need to get to school on time.”).
87
See, e.g., Carlin DeGuerin Miller, Lindsay Lohan Has New Bracelet...the
Ankle Monitoring Kind; Actress Gets Tougher DUI Probation Terms, CBS NEWS
(May 24, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20005761-504083.html
(“A Los Angeles judge ordered the troubled starlet to wear an ankle monitoring
bracelet[.]”).
88
See, e.g., David Pogue, Cellphones that Track the Kids, N.Y. TIMES, December 21, 2006, at C1 (describing how “[a]t least five companies … have built
G.P.S. tracking into something children carry voluntarily: cellphones.”).
89
See, e.g., Matt Fritz, GPS System to Track La Porte School Buses, THE
HERALD ARGUS (Feb. 18, 2011, 5:06 PM),
http://heraldargus.com/articles/2011/02/18/news/local/doc4d5dcd3e9d31e451810001.
txt (explaining the La Porte Community Schools purchased a GPS system to pinpoint
buses at any time and to engage in efficient routing).
90
See, e.g., Electronic tracking device, CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West
2010) (demonstrating an example of such a statutory proscription); Electronic tracking device; location of person without consent; prohibit, H.B. 16, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010) available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/enUS/display/25877.
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tion is the lack of a clear and concise definition for Kyllo’s “general
public use” standard,91 further creating confusion for the judiciary.
United States v. Sparks, a recent federal court decision, provides a
ready example of the confusion stemming from Kyllo’s “general public use” standard. Here, the district court evaluated the FBI’s warrantless use of a GPS tracking device to record and monitor a suspect
vehicle that was eventually used in an armed bank robbery.92 The
court recognized the device was “highly sophisticated,” that it allowed
the FBI to accurately locate the suspect’s “vehicle from any computer,
at any time of the day or night,” and that the FBI could use the GPS
device “to store a record of [the suspect’s] travels for the entirety of
the eleven day period.”93 Despite recognition of the GPS device’s
capabilities, the court noted that “[t]his technology … is not the type
of highly sophisticated equipment that would require a warrant under
Kyllo.”94 Moreover, the court confused the device with navigational
devices in “general public use,” stating that “GPS devices are widely
available to the public at large.”95 Without further Supreme Court
guidance, federal courts will likely continue to inconsistently apply
prior precedent while law enforcement increases the warrantless use
of GPS tracking devices
B. Decision Framework
To address this judicial confusion, the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment foundational holdings in Katz, Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo
can be fashioned into a four-part framework to analyze the constitutionality of warrantless GPS vehicle monitoring. When evaluating
warrantless surveillance, Fourth Amendment protections must favor
the individual’s privacy over the State’s need for information. This
will “prevent stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of
the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts, or by
well-intentioned, but mistakenly over-zealous, executive officers.”96
91
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that using senseenhancing technology that is not in general public use to obtain information that could
otherwise not have been obtained without physical intrusion into a “constitutionally
protected area” constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
92
United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385 (D. Mass. 2010) (noting
that the vehicles involved in a robbery were located through the use of a GPS device).
93
Id. at 393.
94
Id. at 393 n.10.
95
Id. (likening the GPS to “the telephone in 1880 and the video camera in
1950 …. Undoubtedly, a quarter-century from now, the GPS device used in this case
will seem antiquated.”).
96
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
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Because privacy is a “right” afforded by the Fourth Amendment,
analysis of the warrantless use of GPS technology within this framework requires a thorough review of each holding when assessing law
enforcement’s need to seek a warrant.
Utilizing the analytical framework requires sequential application
of the decisions of Katz, Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo to the facts of a
given case. First, a Katz analysis must be conducted when a defendant
invokes Fourth Amendment privacy protections to identify whether
the individual has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and
whether this subjective privacy expectation is objectively reasonable
to society.97 Second, per Knotts, a defendant can have no objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy when their automobile movements
are wholly conducted in public or visible to the public.98 Third, Karo
provides an exception to the prior rule provided by Knotts, that is,
warrantless electronic monitoring cannot reveal information not voluntarily conveyed through public actions in situations where visual
surveillance would have been an appropriate substitute for the electronic surveillance.99 Fourth, as stated in Kyllo, law enforcement cannot use technology that is not in general public use to reveal either
involuntarily conveyed or unknowable information where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding that information.100
97
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(noting that the rule governing the evaluation of one’s Fourth Amendment protection
looks to whether the person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and if the
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable); See also Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (finding that “the application of the Fourth
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a .legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded
by government action …. The second question is whether the individual’s subjective
expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ ….
“).
98
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). (finding that “[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”).
99
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (“The monitoring of an
electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale search,
but it does reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the Government
is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise obtained
without a warrant. , , , [H]ere, as we have said, the monitoring indicated that the
beeper was inside the house, a fact that could not have been visually verified.”).
100
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (finding that “obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ … constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.”) (internal citations omitted).
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When analyzing the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections, it
is vital to note that “the decision to allow law enforcement to use
emerging surveillance technologies is effectively a decision to expand
government power at the expense of the public’s privacy and security.”101 Thus, to protect public security and privacy, search warrants
are scrutinized “by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.”102 To do otherwise “would reduce the [Fourth]
Amendment to a nullity.”103 Consequently, warrants are presumptively required when an intrusion into a Fourth Amendment “constitutionally protected area”104 occurs and this is reflected in the decision
paths of the analytical framework. The following diagram illustrates
the logical flow:
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Ku, supra note 68, at 1331.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
103
Id. (noting that nullifying the warrant requirement would leave homes
unprotected and “[t]he right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”).
104
See e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting that using sense-enhancing technology to obtain information from the home that would not have been available otherwise is “erod[ing] the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”).
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This analytical framework demonstrates that the application of
Katz can immediately create a warrant requirement when an individual exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy that society views as
objectively reasonable. However, although Knotts can, and frequently
will, override the subjective expectation of privacy when GPS tracking is involved, either Karo or Kyllo may provide an exception that
establishes a warrant requirement, and therefore, each must be considered within the analysis. The Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment’s protection, as structured within the framework,
ensures that law enforcement’s warrantless use of GPS technology is
bound by the limits of the Amendment.
III. APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO
MAYNARD
In the recently-decided case, United States v. Maynard, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia unnecessarily fashioned
a new Fourth Amendment approach for the analysis of law enforcement’s use of warrantless GPS monitoring instead of relying on
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precedent.105 The court focused on the Supreme Court’s statement in
Katz that an individual’s knowing exposure of information results in
no cognizable expectation of privacy, and the court went on to find
that the appellant’s movements, as monitored by a warrantless GPS
device, were not “actually” or “constructively” exposed to the public.106 The modification of the “exposes to the public” standard from
Katz107 required consideration of two additional concepts: evaluation
of “what a reasonable person expects another might actually do,”108
and the meta-information related to a “collection of movements.”109
Although the court correctly concluded that law enforcement violated
the Fourth Amendment in Maynard, the same conclusion could have
been reached by the application of prior precedent and without the
construction of a new approach.
A. Right Answer, Wrong Approach: United States v. Maynard
Inserts New Variables into the Equation
In Maynard, the police attached a GPS tracking device to the defendants’ vehicle without a warrant and monitored the vehicle’s
movements for the following four weeks before arresting them for a
variety of drug-related charges.110 The defendant that drove the car,
Jones, argued that under the Katz standard the police had “violated his
‘reasonable expectations of privacy ….’”111 Counsel for the government countered that although the Katz test was relevant, Jones’s expectations of privacy were not reasonable based on the Supreme
Court’s holding in Knotts.112 Contrary to the prior precedent of Knotts
and other federal circuit court cases, however, the D.C. Circuit held
that Jones’s objectively reasonable expectations of privacy were violated since the “totality of Jones’s movements over the course of a
105

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding
that Knotts did not control the case and that the police performed a search when they
violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
106
Id. at 558 (noting that the totality of one’s movements over a month are
“not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all
those movements is effectively nil.” Further, the court notes that constructively, the
whole of one’s movements is not exposed because the “whole reveals more—
sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of its parts.”).
107
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (finding that “[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
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Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559.
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Id. at 560-561.
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Id. at 555.
111
Id.
112
Id.at 555-56.
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month … was not exposed to the public ….”113 In arriving to this conclusion, the court first distinguished Maynard from the Supreme
Court’s holding in Knotts.114
Focusing on the Supreme Court’s statement in Knotts that “[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another,”115 the court decided that the Supreme Court had “explicitly
distinguished between the limited information discovered by the use
of the beeper, movements during a discrete journey, and more comprehensive or sustained monitoring of the sort at issue in this case.”116
Further, the Maynard court explained, “in Knotts the Court actually
reserved the issue of prolonged surveillance. That issue is squarely
presented in this case.”117 Therefore, from the D.C. Circuit’s perspective, the limited holding in Knotts distinguished it from the issues
before it in Maynard, and so, it proceeded to analyze the warrantless
use of GPS monitoring under the Katz legitimate expectation of privacy standard.118
The court applied the Katz test by concentrating on the information that the monitoring of Jones’s movements had been “exposed to
the public” and evaluating whether Jones had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy regarding that information.119 First, the
court reasoned that “unlike one’s movements during a single journey,
the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe
all those movements is effectively nil.”120 The court then found that
Jones’s movements were not exposed to the public because it would
be very difficult, if not impossible, to track the movement of a person
day after day and “week in and week out” until “all the places, people,
amusements, and chores that make up that person’s hitherto private
routine” had been “identified.”121 In the court’s view, the proper question should be “what a reasonable person expects another might actually do.”122 So, although a “theoretical possibility”123 existed for law
113
114
115
116

Id. at 558.
Id. at 555-56.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (emphasis added).
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276

(1983)).
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enforcement to monitor Jones’s movements, the question “depends …
upon the actual likelihood of … discovery by a stranger.”124 Since
“the likelihood a stranger would observe all those movements is not
just remote, it is essentially nil,” the court found the collection of his
movements were not voluntarily conveyed.125
Second, the Maynard court determined that “the whole of one’s
movements is not exposed constructively even though each individual
movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more―sometimes a
great deal more―than does the sum of its parts.”126 Noting that the
“whole of Jones’s movements … was constructively exposed because
each of his individual movements during that time was itself in public
view” the court reviewed whether Jones should have an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in his collection of movements.127
Referencing Supreme Court decisions related to collections of data,
the Maynard court found a precedential basis for determining that
there are privacy expectations in a person’s “habits and patterns that
mark the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life ….”128
Stating that a reasonable person expects the collection of their movements “to remain ‘disconnected and anonymous’,”129 the court concluded that “the extended recordation of a person’s movements is …
not what we expect anyone to do, and it reveals more than we expect
anyone to know.”130
Having found that Jones’s movements were not both “actually”
and “constructively” exposed to the public, the court then analyzed
whether “his expectations of privacy in those movements was reasonable ….”131 Focusing on the majority opinion in Katz, the D.C. Circuit
stated, “in Katz the Court clearly stated what [one] seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”132 The Maynard court found that applying the
Katz test can “lead to only one conclusion: Society recognizes Jones’s
expectation of privacy in his movements over the course of a month as
reasonable, and the use of the GPS device to monitor those movements defeated that reasonable expectation.”133 Although the court
124
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recognized that other federal circuits had held that GPS monitoring
was not a search, the D.C. Circuit noted that the other Circuits were
simply “not alert to the distinction drawn in Knotts between shortterm and prolonged surveillance ….”134
Since the Maynard court created a new right of privacy in a collection of movements, but also stressed, “[s]urveillance that reveals
only what is already exposed to the public―such as a person’s
movements during a single journey―is not a search,”135 the challenge
for the police applying this new standard is now determining the level
of surveillance that establishes a “pattern of movements” for any prolonged surveillance activities. Moreover, the Maynard court left unanswered whether prolonged monitoring of a vehicle through the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device always violates an individual’s
reasonable expectations of privacy.136 Application of the Supreme
Court’s decisions using the analytical framework provided by Katz,
Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo could have resulted in a satisfactory result
without splitting the federal circuits’ approach.
B.

Applying Katz

When analyzing Fourth Amendment privacy protections, the Katz
test is first applied to identify whether the individual has exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy and whether this subjective privacy
expectation is objectively reasonable to society.137 Applying Katz to
the facts of Maynard, it becomes clear that the defendant, Jones, did
not invoke any Fourth Amendment privacy protections through the
outward exhibition of a subjective expectation of privacy.138 Jones
performed no actions to mask his individual or collective movements,
even those as simple as using more than one vehicle when conducting
his criminal activities or screening his car from exposure by placing it
in a non-public parking space. Exposing “objects … to the ‘plain
view’ of outsiders” removes those objects from the protection of the
Fourth Amendment “because no intention to keep them to himself has
been exhibited.”139
134

Id. at 564.
Id. at 565.
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137
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Id.
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Id.; Contra Eric Dean Bender, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial
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The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that evaluation of
subjective expectations within the Katz standard can “provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection” when they have
“been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms” and “in such cases, a normative inquiry would
be proper.”140 Such a “conditioning” can be properly perceived in an
individual’s expectation that they are not under constant warrantless
surveillance from their government141. Moreover, “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”142 Even
when an individual expresses no subjective expectation of privacy,
they are “entitled to know [they] will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures” and that they are not “secure from Fourth
Amendment violations only in the discretion of the police.”143
Therefore, under the analytical framework, although the defendant
in Maynard failed to exhibit a subjective intention that is objectively
reasonable to society,144 this was not determinative of his right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. It does, though, preclude an immediate determination that law enforcement was required to obtain a
warrant before using GPS tracking to monitor Jones’s movements.145
C.

Applying Knotts

Employing Knotts to the facts in Maynard, however, reveals that
Jones could not have had any objectively reasonable expectations of
privacy regarding his movements conducted wholly on public streets
or visible from public locations.146 Since all of the automobile movements tracked in Maynard were conducted on public thoroughfares,147
applying Knotts within the analytical framework does not result in a
requirement for the police involved to have sought a warrant before
their warrantless use of the GPS tracking device. This does not end
the analysis, but instead advances to considerations of Fourth
Amendment warrant protections provided by the Supreme Court in
Karo and Kyllo. Conversely, when considering Knotts, the Maynard
expectation of privacy because he did not take extraordinary precautions against the
specific way in which the state conducted the surveillance.”).
140
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979).
141
Id.
142
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
143
Id. at 359.
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146
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147
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court simply sidestepped the issue since, in the court’s view, the Supreme Court in Knotts had “reserved the issue of prolonged surveillance [and] … [t]hat issue is squarely presented in this case.”148
The Knotts Court had preserved this issue when faced with the
concern that upholding the government’s use of warrantless tracking
would invite “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this
country … without judicial knowledge or supervision.”149 Reserving
the determination for later, the Supreme Court held that “different
constitutional principles may be applicable” if “such dragnet type law
enforcement practices … should … occur.”150 Consequently, in subsequent federal cases it became crucial to determine whether “dragnet” type law enforcement practices were being practiced in the matter
at bar. Although not wholly in accord, the federal courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s use of the term “dragnet” to represent
some type of “mass” or “wholesale” surveillance.151 These lower
courts appear to agree that an indiscriminate network of GPS tracking
devices affixed to thousands of vehicles to monitor their movements
is clearly a constitutional violation.152 Yet, prior to the decision in
Maynard, all federal circuit courts had upheld prolonged warrantless
GPS tracking of automobiles on “public thoroughfares”153 even
though the Knotts Court had failed to distinguish how electronic
tracking of a single individual “is not Fourth Amendment activity but
that
the
indiscriminate use against many is.”154
Nevertheless, application of Knotts within the analytical framework is designed to only identify instances where the warrantless use
of GPS technology was used by law enforcement in areas our society
understands are worthy of “protection from government invasion.”155
This includes travel on private roads that are not visible from public
locations and automobile movement into private garages or similar
spaces. In Maynard, travel was wholly within the public space and for
that reason, the analysis moved to the Fourth Amendment exceptions
provided by Karo and Kyllo.
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Applying Karo

When stating the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment,
the Court in Karo held that warrantless electronic monitoring cannot
reveal information involuntarily conveyed through public actions
where visual surveillance would have provided a substitute.156 The
application of the Karo holding to the facts in Maynard provides an
exception the Maynard court sought in their analysis. Specifically,
since in the Maynard court’s opinion law enforcement could not have
practically conducted a visual surveillance of Jones’ movements over
the four-week period, the GPS tracking that was performed had no
non-technological substitute.157 Moreover, in Maynard, the lack of a
visual surveillance substitute was noted by a Special Agent testifying
for the prosecution who stated, “[p]hysical surveillance is actually
hard … [t]here’s always chances of getting spotted … so we decided
to use GPS technology.”158 So, although Jones’s information was
“voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look,”159 the prolonged monitoring of Jones violated his legitimate interest in privacy
under Karo since it “could not have been visually verified.”160
Nevertheless, while the Maynard court could assert the Karo
holding establishes a clear exemption from law enforcement’s warrantless use of GPS tracking to monitor Jones, not all Fourth Amendment
experts agree the language within Karo should be interpreted literally.161 Because of this, analysis of Maynard within the analytical
framework should advance to the privacy protections provided by
Kyllo.
E. Applying Kyllo
Despite the support for Jones in Karo, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo is determinative on the outcome of the analytical framework’s analysis of Maynard. As held by the Court in Kyllo, “obtaining
by sense-enhancing technology any information … that could not
otherwise have been obtained without … ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search … where … the technol156
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ogy in question is not in general public use.”162 Yet, the GPS tracking
technology used by law enforcement in Maynard: 1) is a device not in
general public use;163 2) is being used to obtain information that could
otherwise not be obtained;164 and 3) is intruding on intimate details of
an individual’s past and current activities.165 Since the Court in Kyllo
expressed an intent to limit the “power of technology to shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy,”166 the Maynard court, given the facts
surrounding the case, should presume that use of this technology by
law enforcement violates a justifiable expectation of privacy absent a
warrant.
Furthering the restrictive presumption of Kyllo is the Court’s recognition that “the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”167 GPS
tracking devices used by law enforcement represent precisely the type
of “extrasensory”168 surveillance systems the Kyllo Court intended to
prevent from revealing an individual’s “unknowable” information.169
Moreover, the Court emphasized in Kyllo that the “means” of collecting information matter, and therefore “[t]he fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not make
lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment.”170
In Maynard, the means of surveillance, a GPS tracking device not
in general public use, was used to acquire information that Jones had a
justifiable expectation of privacy in safeguarding.171 Further, although
equivalent information theoretically could have been obtained, under
current Fourth Amendment standards “it should take much more than
the mere theoretical possibility of a member of the public engaging in
surveillance of equivalent intensity to undo one’s justified expectation
of privacy.”172 Consequently, application of Kyllo within the analytical framework to the facts of Maynard categorizes the warrantless use
of GPS tracking as a violation of the privacy protection conferred by
162
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the Fourth Amendment. To hold otherwise “would be to permit police
technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”173
IV.CONCLUSION
Adhering to an analytical framework provided by the Supreme
Court precedents of Katz, Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo provides a standard approach to assessing law enforcement’s need to seek a warrant
before conducting surveillance of automobile movements. Utilization
of this framework in United States v. Maynard could have prevented
the splintering of the standard of review for evaluation of the warrantless use of GPS technology by law enforcement while still preserving
the rights provided by the Fourth Amendment.
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